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CONTEXTUAL KNOWLEDGE IN 
AND AROUND SCIENCE
Abstract: Th e original concept of epistemic 
dependence suggests uncritical deference 
to expert opinions for non-experts. In 
the light of recent work in science studies, 
however, the actual situation of epistemic 
dependence is seen to involve the necessary 
and ubiquitous need for lay evaluations 
of scientifi c experts. As expert knowledge 
means restricted cognitive access to some 
epistemic domain, lay evaluations of ex-
pert knowledge are rational and informed 
only when the criteria used by non-experts 
when judging experts are diff erent from 
the criteria used by experts when mak-
ing their claims. Th e distinction between 
“substantial knowledge” and “contextual 
knowledge” allows for the laypeople to 
know with experts without having to 
know precisely what experts know. Such 
meta-expert evaluations are not specifi c to 
the public sphere outside science, nor are 
they limited internally to science, but they 
are present in a wide range of contexts in 
and around science. Th e paper legitimizes 
the concept of contextual knowledge by 
relating it to the relevant literature, and 
expounds the idea by identifying some 
elements of such a knowledge.
Keywords: epistemic dependence; ex-
pertise; public understanding of science; 
social epistemology; testimony
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Poznávat spolu s experty: 
kontextuální vědění ve vědě a kolem ní
Abstrakt: Původní koncept epistémické 
závislosti podněcoval u ne-expertů nekri-
tickou podřízenost expertním názorům. 
Ve světle nedávného vývoje ve zkoumání 
vědy se však skutečná situace episté-
mické závislosti jeví tak, že zahrnuje 
nezbytnou a  všudypřítomnou potřebu 
pro laické hodnocení vědeckých expertů. 
Jelikož expertní vědění znamená ome-
zení poznávacího přístupu k  některým 
epistémickým doménám, laická hodno-
cení expertního vědění jsou racionální 
a informovaná pouze tehdy, když se kri-
téria užívaná ne-experty při posuzování 
expertů liší od kritérií užívaných experty 
pro jejich tvrzení. Rozlišení mezi „sub-
stanciálním věděním“ a „kontextuálním 
věděním“ umožňuje laikům poznávat 
spolu s  experty bez toho, že by museli 
vědět přesně totéž, co oni. Taková meta-
-expertní hodnocení nejsou specifi cká 
pro veřejnou sféru mimo vědu ani nejsou 
na  vědu vnitřně omezená, ale vyskytují 
se v široké míře kontextů ve vědě a kolem 
ní. Tento článek legitimizuje koncept 
kontextuálního vědění jeho vztažením 
k  relevantní literatuře a  objasňuje tuto 
myšlenku pomocí identifi kace některých 
prvků takového vědění.
Klíčová slova: epistémická závislost; 
expertíza; veřejné chápání vědy; sociální 
epistemologie; svědectví
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1. Epistemic dependence
A central problem in recent epistemology is the problem of indirect or tes-
timonial knowledge. Much of what we take to be known is indirect for us in 
the sense that it is based on our trust in other people’s direct knowledge, in 
contrast with the idea of direct knowledge related to fi rst-person empirical 
evidence and its rational assessment. In the past decades, the problem has 
been intensely investigated in the fi eld of social epistemology, emerging from 
a thematic issue of the journal Synthese (October 1987) in which groundbre-
aking positions were outlined, e.g., by Steve Fuller1 and Alvin Goldman.2 Si-
milar problems have been discussed in socialized versions of the philosophy 
of science,3 or refl ecting specifi cally to the problem of testimony,4 especially 
in the history of science.5
A perhaps decisive inspiration to this emerging tradition was the elo-
quent characterization of the fundamental epistemological problem given 
by John Hardwig, who coined the term epistemic dependence.6 He sets off  
by claiming, as an explication of a basic and common experience, that the 
source of a good deal (or even vast majority) of what we know is deference to 
epistemic authorities, and the greater the cultural complexity is, the more it 
is so. In the dominantly empiricist epistemological tradition, however, these 
elements of belief are not considered rational inasmuch as their acceptance 
1  Steve FULLER, “On Regulating What Is Known: A Way to Social Epistemology.” Synthese, 
vol. 73, no. 1, 1987, p.  145–183. Fuller is the founder of the journal Social Epistemology in 
1987, and also author of the book Social Epistemology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 
1988).
2  Alvin GOLDMAN, “Foundations of Social Epistemics.” Synthese, vol. 73, no. 1, 1987, p. 109–
144. He was later founder of the journal Episteme: a journal of social epistemology in 2004, and 
author of Knowledge in a Social World (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999) and Pathways 
to Knowledge: Private and Public (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002).
3  E.g. Philip KITCHER, Th e Advancement of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1993; 
or Miriam SOLOMON, Social Empiricism. Cambridge: MIT Press 2001; and also feminist 
epistemologies such as Helen LONGINO, Science as Social Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 1990.
4  E.g. C. A. J. COADY, Testimony. Oxford University Press 1992; Martin KUSCH, Knowledge 
by Agreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002; Jennifer LACKEY – Ernest SOSA (eds.), 
Th e Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006.
5  E.g. Steven SHAPIN, A Social History of Truth. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1994; or 
see the June 2002 issue of the journal Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science.
6  John HARDWIG, “Epistemic dependence.” Th e Journal of Philosophy, vol. 82, 1985, 
p. 335–349.
Th e work was supported by the Bolyai Research Scholarship. I am grateful to Natalie Ross for 
her useful corrections, and to two anonymous reviewers for their suggestions.
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is not based on rational evidence (since the testimony of others does not 
seem to be a rational evidence). So if we want to avoid the seemingly absurd 
conclusion that the majority of our knowledge is irrational, proportionally to 
social complexity, then we are faced with a dilemma: 1. Either we have to say 
that “someone can know ‘vicariously’ – i.e., without possessing the evidence 
for the truth of what he knows, perhaps without even fully understanding 
what he knows”.7 2. Or we have to accept that “the community of inquirers is 
the primary knower and that individual knowledge is derivative”,8 and then 
we give up the fancy idea of intellectual autonomy (Hardwig opts for this 
second solution).
Note that already the term “dependence” suggests a strongly asymmet-
rical relation between experts (people with direct knowledge) and laypeople 
(those with indirect knowledge only). Hardwig takes a pessimistic position 
regarding the possibility of laypeople’s assessment of expert opinions: since 
laypeople are, by defi nition, those who fall back on the testimony of experts, 
they have hardly any means of rationally evaluating expert claims. Of 
course, laypeople can ponder on the reliability of certain experts, or rank 
the relative reliability of several experts, but it can only be rationally done 
by asking further experts and relying on their assessments – in which case 
we only lengthened our chain of epistemic dependence, instead of getting 
rid of it.9 So, according to Hardwig, we have to fully accept our epistemic 
inferiority to experts, and either rely uncritically on expert claims or, even 
when criticizing these claims, we have to rely uncritically on experts’ replies 
to our critical remarks.10
In this paper I argue that laypeople’s epistemic inferiority to experts is 
not as straightforward as portrayed by Hardwig, and that laypeople have 
important means of assessing expert opinions. First I  turn to the relevant 
literature in order to identify contexts where such assessment seems not 
only possible but necessary, and summarize some of the solutions off ered. 
Th en I try to show that both the concepts of “expert” and “layperson” need 
to be reconsidered in the light of those essential transformations that has 
recently taken place, on the one hand, in the public perception of science 
and its social role and, on the other hand, in the philosophical, historical 
and sociological studies of science. Finally I off er a vague description of what 
7  Ibid., p. 348.
8  Ibid., p. 349.
9  Ibid., p. 341.
10  Ibid., p. 342.
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might be classed as elements of meta-expertise, and suggest how the concept 
of contextual knowledge may bridge the gap between highly specialized 
knowledge and complete ignorance.
2. Suspending the epistemic inferiority complex
2.1 Hardwig’s ad hominems
At one point even Hardwig admits that laypeople’s otherwise necessary 
inferiority can be suspended in a certain type of situations that he calls ad 
hominem:11
Th e layman can assert that the expert is not a disinterested, neutral witness; that 
his interest in the outcome of the discussion prejudices his testimony. Or that 
he is not operating in good faith–that he is lying, for example, or refusing to ac-
knowledge a mistake in his views because to do so would tend to undermine his 
claim to special competence. Or that he is covering for his peers or knuckling 
under to social pressure from others in his fi eld, etc., etc.
However, before we get too optimistic and try to generalize, Hardwig 
warns us that these ad hominems “seem and perhaps are much more admis-
sible, important, and damning in a layman’s discussions with experts than 
they are in dialogues among peers”, since ad hominems are easy to fi nd out 
in science via testing and evaluating claims.12 And apart from these rare and 
obvious cases, laypeople have no other choice left  than blindly relying on 
expert testimonies.
Let us have a closer look at ad hominems.13 Th e target of ad hominem 
arguments is not the content of claims but rather the circumstances of the 
interlocutor making these claims. Such an attitude is usually seen as falla-
cious or abusive, on the supposition that the truth of a claim has nothing 
to do  with how, by whom, and in what circumstances the claim is made. 
Th is supposition, however, is far from unproblematic, but even without ad-
dressing it theoretically we may simply observe that – in some cases, like the 
11  Ibid.
12  Ibid., p. 343.
13  See e.g. Douglas WALTON, Ad Hominem Arguments. Tuscaloosa – London: Th e University 
of Alabama Press 1998; or Frans van EEMEREN – Rob GROOTENDORST, “Th e History 
of the Argumentum Ad Hominem Since the Seventeenth Century.” In: KRABBE, E. C. W. – 
DALITZ, R. J. – SMIT, P. A. (eds.), Empirical Logic and Public Debate. Amsterdam: Rodopi 
1984, p. 49–68.
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ones above – ad hominems seem to give obvious and rational justifi cation 
for the rejection of claims. Similarly, the plausibility of some claims made 
by politicians, diplomats, or salesmen is clearly eff ected by the knowledge of 
the circumstances in which the claims were made. What is important here 
is that epistemic access to the context is markedly diff erent from epistemic 
access to the content, and this provides the layperson with at least a slight 
possibility of evaluating specialist claims.
In order to investigate the scope of this possibility, we now turn to some 
solutions, suggested in the literature on scientifi c expertise, to the problem 
of how laypeople can evaluate expert claims. It is not only the precise sug-
gestions themselves that are relevant here but also the situations in which, 
according to the authors, laypeople’s assessment of expert claims seems 
necessary and unavoidable.
2.2 Brewer and the Juries
Scott Brewer, a  philosopher of law, considers the situation of court trials 
where non-expert judges and juries are entitled to evaluate expert testimo-
nies, including scientifi c ones.14 In these cases simple epistemic deference 
is obviously out of question, so instead, Brewer lists what he identifi es as 
possible routes to “warranted epistemic deference”, i.e. means of non-expert 
evaluation of expert claims. Th ese are: substantive second guessing, using 
general canons of rational evidentiary support, evaluating demeanor, and 
evaluating credentials.
Substantive second guessing means that the layperson has, at least to 
some degree, epistemic access to the content of expert argument and she 
can understand and assess the evidences supporting the expert claim. Of 
course, as Brewer admits, such situations are rare since scientifi c arguments 
are usually highly technical. But the main problem here is theoretical rather 
than practical: the possibility of substantive second guessing blurs the 
distinction between experts and laypeople. Expertise, as we will see later, 
means restricted epistemic access, as expressed by the concept of epistemic 
dependence. What I suggest is that if there is second guessing in work here 
then it is circumstantial or contextual rather than substantive. Th e three 
other routes off ered by Brewer may serve as examples.
14  Scott BREWER, “Scientifi c Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process.” Th e Yale Law 
Journal, vol. 107, 1998, p. 1535–1681.
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Th e second route is using general canons of rational evidentiary sup-
port. If an expert argument is incoherent (e.g. self-contradicting) or unable 
to make or follow basic distinctions (in his example, between causing and 
not preventing) then, even for the layperson, it becomes evident that such 
an argument is unreliable. From the practical point of view, this possibility 
is available only when the argument is simple and non-technical enough for 
the layperson to follow, just like in the case of substantive second guessing, 
and it is rarely the case. But theoretically, this option is dissimilar from the 
previous one in that it is not the content of the argument non-experts need 
to have access to but rather the form, and this requires on their side skills 
and competences diff erent from those of the expert.
Evaluating the demeanor is similar in this respect: the criteria used 
to evaluate demeanor are clearly diff erent from those used to evaluate the 
content of claims. Laypeople may try to weigh up how sincere, confi dent, 
unbiased, committed etc. the expert is, and this obviously infl uences to what 
degree non-experts tend to rely on expert claims. In traditional rhetori-
cal terms, all this belongs to the ethos of the speaker which has been held, 
especially in the past century, in high suspicion because of its capacity to 
contribute to persuasion (of any kind) as opposed to rational conviction. 
Brewer shares this suspicion and emphasizes the abusive potential in demea-
nor oft en exploited by the American legal system where there is a market 
for persuasive and competent-looking expert witnesses, and he concludes 
that demeanor is an untrustworthy guide. But for us it suffi  ces to note here 
that however untrustworthy it may be, in some situations demeanor may 
be found to be informative (rather than simply persuasive) with respect to 
the plausibility of expert claims, and thus it serves as a means of evaluating 
experts.
Th e most reliable route, according to Brewer, is the evaluation of the ex-
pert’s credentials, including scientifi c reputation. He adopts the credentialist 
position15 even while acknowledging that it is laden with serious theoretical 
diffi  culties, such as the regress problem (ranking similar credentials requires 
asking additional experts), or the underdetermination problem (similar 
credentials underdetermine our choice between rivaling experts). In order 
to be able to evaluate scientifi c credentials, one needs to have some degree of 
familiarity with the institutional structure of science (rankings, positions, 
15  Similarly e.g. to Anthony KENNY, “Th e Expert in Court.” Law Quarterly Review, vol. 99, 
1983, p. 197–216.
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organizations, etc.), which is another, quite specialized, type of contextual 
knowledge needed to assess claims made by scientifi c experts.
2.3 Goldman and rivaling experts
Another feature of legal court trials, in addition to the inherent necessity of 
the situation to evaluate experts by non-experts, is that in the typical case la-
ypeople are confronted with two, usually contradicting, expert testimonies. 
Such circumstances are not restricted to the courtroom, of course, but the 
signifi cance one attributes to them clearly depends on how widespread or 
general they are seen. Hardwig, for instance, is aware that simple epistemic 
deference is inapplicable in cases of divided expert opinion, but in his semi-
nal paper he devotes only one paragraph to the problem,16 perhaps because 
he thinks that such cases are exceptions rather than the rule. He suggests 
that laypeople should refrain from forming their opinion when faced with 
rivaling expert claims (i.e. incompatible claims about the same issue), or if 
they do form an opinion they have to keep in mind that they did it on irrati-
onal grounds. So the more frequent and typical these situations are, the less 
usable Hardwig’s solution of simple epistemic deference becomes.
Alvin Goldman, a central fi gure in social epistemology, tries to identify 
those sources of evidence that laypeople can call upon when choosing from 
rivaling expert opinions–in situations where epistemic solutions of “blind 
reliance” break down.17 According to him, these are: argument-based evi-
dence, agreement from other experts, appraisals by meta-experts, considera-
tion of interests and biases, and evidence of track-records.
Goldman distinguishes between two types of argumentative justifi ca-
tion. “Direct” justifi cation means that the non-expert understands the 
expert argument and is able to evaluate it, similarly to what Brewer means 
by substantive second guessing. Goldman tries to maintain the gap between 
experts and laypeople by saying that some expert arguments can be formu-
lated in an exoteric language that is accessible to the layperson, and this is 
where direct justifi cation is possible. But when arguments are formulated in 
an unavoidably esoteric language, non-experts still have the possibility to 
give “indirect” justifi cation by evaluating what Goldman calls argumenta-
tive performance: certain features of the arguer’s behavior in controversies 
16  HARDWIG, “Epistemic dependence,” p. 343.
17  Alvin GOLDMAN, “Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, vol. 63, no. 1, 2001, p. 85–109.
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(quickness of replies, handling counter-arguments, etc.) indicate the degree 
of competence, without requiring from the non-expert to share the compe-
tences of the expert.
Additional experts can be used in two ways in Goldman’s classifi cation: 
either by asking which of the rivaling opinions is agreed upon by a greater 
number of experts, or by asking meta-experts (i.e. experts evaluating other 
experts) for judgment on the expert making the claims. For Goldman, this 
type includes the credentialist solution as well, for credentials are issued 
by meta-experts and represent their evaluation of the expert in question. 
He deals with these cases simultaneously and claims that they are basically 
the same, since meta-experts use decision criteria that are as inaccessible to 
non-experts as the ones used by the subject level experts, so eventually all 
these cases boil down to comparing mere numbers. And that, as he argues 
at length, is unreliable.
Similarly to Hardwig’s ad hominem cases, Goldman also considers 
the possibility of identifying interests and biases in the arguer’s position. 
As interests and biases are usually easier to measure than arguments or 
credentials, he attributes considerable signifi cance to these cases, even with 
the qualifi cation that far too oft en both of the rivaling experts are interested 
and biased to the same degree which, as in Brewer’s analysis of credentials, 
underdetermines the decision.
What Goldman sees as the most reliable source of evidence is track-
record. He argues that even highly esoteric domains can produce exoteric 
results or performances (e.g. predictions) on the basis of which the non-
expert becomes able to evaluate the cognitive success of the expert. While 
using this criterion requires from the laypeople to pay signifi cant eff ort to 
examining and comparing diff erent track records, in situations where the 
choice between experts leads to serious consequences (e.g. a courtroom situ-
ation surely belongs here) such an eff ort seems justifi ed.
2.4 Studies of expertise and experience (SEE)
Despite their diff erent answers to the question of most reliable decision 
criteria, Brewer and Goldman agree that sounder evaluation needs special 
attention, either by studying the institutional structure of science or by 
examining specialists’ track-records. But why should laypeople take the 
eff ort of improving their contextual knowledge of science? If we turn from 
philosophical epistemology to the social studies of science and technology, 
we fi nd an answer at the core of the discipline: because laypeople’s lives are 
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embedded in a world in which both science and experts play a crucial role, 
but where not all experts represent science and even those who do, represent 
various, oft en incompatible, claims from which laypeople have to choose 
what to believe.
Th e program called “studies of expertise and experience” (SEE) evolved 
in a  framework shaped by these presuppositions. It was initiated by sci-
ence studies guru Harry Collins and Robert Evans when they advertised 
and urged the “third wave” of science studies.18 Th eir initial problem is that 
“the speed of politics exceeds the speed of scientifi c consensus formation”,19 
meaning that decision making processes outside science (politics, economy, 
the public sphere, etc.) are usually faster than similar processes in science. 
Th is gives rise to what they call “the problem of legitimacy”:20 how is techno-
logical decision making possible given the growing social uncertainty? Th ey 
claim that solutions are already achieved, or pointed to, in the fi eld of “public 
participation in science”. However, a related but yet unsolved problem is “the 
problem of extension”, i.e. to what degree should the public be engaged in 
technical decision making? Th e program of SEE is meant to provide norma-
tive answers to this question.
In this framework the term “expert” has a wide range of applications, 
since experts are defi ned as those “who know what they are talking about”,21 
which is based on immersion in communicative life forms.22 Forms of ex-
pertise range from ubiquitous skills (such as native language usage) to the 
highest degree of scientifi c specialization, as summarized in “the periodic 
table of expertises”.23 What is relevant here is that this table includes, in ad-
dition to types of specialist expertise, those forms of “meta-expertise” that 
can be used to judge and evaluate specialist expertise.
18  Harry COLLINS – Robert EVANS, “Th e Th ird Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise 
and Experience.” Social Studies of Science, vol. 32, no. 2, 2002, p. 235–296; later expanded to 
Harry COLLINS – Robert EVANS, Rethinking Expertise. Chicago: Th e University of Chicago 
Press 2007. 
19  COLLINS – EVANS, Rethinking Expertise, p. 8.
20  COLLINS – EVANS, “Th e Th ird Wave of Science Studies,” p. 237.
21  COLLINS – EVANS, Rethinking Expertise, p. 2.
22  Th is conception is criticized e.g. by Evan SELINGER – John MIX, “On Interactional 
Expertise: Pragmatic and Ontological Considerations.” In: SELINGER, E. – CREASE, R. 
P. (eds.), Th e Philosophy of Expertise. New York: Columbia University Press 2006, p. 302–321; 
or in Evan SELINGER – Hubert DREYFUS – Harry COLLINS, “Interactional Expertise and 
Embodiment.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 38, 2007, p. 722–740.
23  COLLINS – EVANS, Rethinking Expertise, p. 14.
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As the theory distinguishes between, on the one hand, those kinds of 
specialist expertise that are based on esoterically available tacit knowledge 
and, on the other hand, those that are supported by exoteric information 
only, a similar distinction is introduced for meta-expertise. Th ere are meta-
experts who evaluate other experts as formal equals (scientists on other 
scientists), or as representatives of meta-sciences (political scientists on 
politicians, literary critics on writers, etc.) – i.e., professionally. But apart 
from that, a widespread deference to experts is a basic necessity in modern 
societies, and laypeople are thus forced to acquire skills and “social intelli-
gence” needed to cope in an expert culture. So non-experts are able to bring 
decisions regarding technical questions on non-technical grounds, either 
when they have personal access to part of the social relations (“local dis-
crimination”), or when they as complete outsiders come to decisions based 
on their social experiences (“global discrimination”).
Also in this “periodic table” one can fi nd “meta-criteria” for evaluating 
experts. One of these is credentials and, as opposed to Brewer, Collins and 
Evans fi nd this source as the least reliable of all–especially in fi elds outside 
science where there are no credentials at all. Th ey consider track-records to 
be somewhat more trustworthy, but the practical problem here is also that 
in many areas of expertise track-records are nonexistent. So what they fi nd 
most reliable is the past experience of experts, but unfortunately it is not 
elaborated how an expert’s experience could become accessible and measur-
able from the non-expert perspective. However, all these meta-criteria are 
such that they need special focus on the layperson’s side to assess, while in 
most cases the public would want to come to decisions based on less local 
details.
In order to form technical judgments based on non-technical and rela-
tively general warrants, laypeople need some kind of social intelligence to 
rely upon. As Collins and Evans claim:
[Th e] judgment turns on whether the author of a scientifi c claim appears to have 
the appropriate scientifi c demeanor and/or the appropriate location within the 
social networks of scientists and/or not too much in the way of a political and 
fi nancial interest in the claim.24
Th ey illustrate the point with three examples: astrology, manned moon 
landings and cold fusion. In all cases they claim that people (or at least suf-
fi ciently informed people) in Western societies have enough social skills 
24  Ibid., p. 45.
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to arrive at the correct conclusion–that astrology is not a  science (since 
astrologists are not contained by the social networks of science), that moon 
landings are not faked (since such a huge conspiracy is not conceivable in 
our societies), and that cold fusion experiments did not succeed (and do not 
belong to the network of science anymore). To me, however, it seems that 
these examples are convincing only insofar the non-experts we are talking 
about are really informed, which is closer to an idealistic society the actual 
ones I know.
To sum up the main points of this section: It seems clear that despite 
all the possible theoretical diffi  culties, laypeople can and do make evalua-
tions of expert claims, and since laypeople are not experts in terms of their 
cognitive domains, these evaluations are based on criteria external to the 
specialist domain. Also, such external evaluations are not only frequent but 
generally unavoidable in a world of rivaling experts and consensus-lacking 
controversial issues. But while the relevant external criteria are numerous 
and various, the reliability of these evaluations generally depends on some 
degree of focus and eff ort on the layperson’s side toward knowing scientists 
as experts. In order to give a more systematic account, the concepts of lay-
person and expert need to be reconsidered.
3. Expertise and the public
3.1 Experts
Th e problem of experts has been present in the history of Western thought 
at least since Socrates of the early dialogues of Plato, who sought to fi nd 
what knowledge is by asking and then confronting some of the most renown 
experts of his day. Recently the concept has received an intensifi ed attention. 
“A signifi cant milestone is reached when a fi eld of scientifi c research matures 
to a point warranting publication of its fi rst handbook”, claims the beginning 
sentence of the fi rst handbook of expertise25 that summarizes mainly the 
relevant psychological research of the past few decades in 900 dense pages. 
What we have discussed so far illustrates that the topic has also been addres-
sed in philosophy,26 or in the social studies of science where the initiative 
25  K. Anders ERICSSON – Neil CHARNESS – Paul J. FELTOVICH – Robert R. HOFFMAN 
(eds.), Th e Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2006, p. 3.
26  See e.g. Evan SELINGER – Robert CREASE (eds.), Th e Philosophy of Expertise. New York: 
Columbia University Press 2006.
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paper by Collins and Evans27 has become one of the most frequent points of 
reference in the fi eld. Other forms of an “expertise-hype” can be seen in the 
theory of management, in risk assessment, in artifi cial intelligence research, 
in didactics, and in a number of other fi elds having to do with the concept 
of “expert”. Of course, the wide variety of relevant disciplines breeds many 
diff erent concepts of expertise and poses many diff erent questions, and there 
is no coherent theoretical approach covering even a whole discipline, not to 
mention all of these together. Th is implies that an intuitive understanding 
of expertise is insuffi  cient here and, without wanting to build or use any 
full-fl edged background theory, some points need to be explicated.
Th e conception of expertise this paper relies on is not an essentialist 
one. I am not interested in what or who experts are, i.e. what it is that makes 
an expert an expert. Th e psychological literature examines how experts 
perform better than non-experts and what cognitive or other factors display 
the diff erence. Brewer relates the concept of expertise to the notion of under-
standing and describes epistemic competence,28 Goldman tries to defi ne it 
in “veritistic” terms and connects it to information-processing know-how,29 
Collins and Evans refer to life forms and discursive communities.30 My as-
sumptions are perhaps even less demanding and purely phenomenological 
(in the broadest sense): it is an elementary experience (and at the same time 
presupposition) of our culture that in many areas there are such people as 
experts to whom we turn with our problems and questions.
On the other hand, nor does it seem satisfactory to suffi  ce with a purely 
attributional conception, i.e. to say that being an expert is nothing more 
than being handled as an expert. Th e two minimal necessary conditions that 
represent the normative character of the concept are that it is experience-
based and it is epistemically restricted. Th e experience requirement is 
already contained by the term “expert”, coming from the Latin expertus, 
experienced. Prima facie, someone with experience is opposed to someone 
with indirect (testimonial) knowledge only, or someone with no knowledge 
at all. But experience is also in contrast with pure factual knowledge, or 
fake knowledge, etc. Moreover, skills based on experience can have diff erent 
degrees depending on the amount and intensity of that experience, and this 
27  COLLINS – EVANS, “Th e Th ird Wave of Science Studies.”
28  BREWER, “Scientifi c Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process.”
29  GOLDMAN, “Experts: Which Ones Should You Trust?”
30  COLLINS – EVANS, Rethinking Expertise.
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means that expert skills are improvable.31 Usually in organized cultures, 
relevant experience and resulting skills are improved by training, oft en in 
institutionalized forms.
Th e other normative requirement on expertise is that it means restricted 
cognitive access to a domain. Th is assumption goes counter to the theory of 
Collins and Evans, since they include ubiquitous skills among forms of ex-
pertise. But such an extension of the scope seems too wide in that those situ-
ations it covers in addition are such that they lack the relation of epistemic 
dependence, and so are not relevant to this paper. Reading, for example, 
is a skill that is based on experience and training, but we would not call it 
expertise simply because it is practically ubiquitous–while a thousand years 
ago it was an important form of expertise due to its restricted availability. In 
this sense expertise is an important form of cultural capital,32 in case it off ers 
skill or knowledge that is worthy and valuable for the society.33
Th e kinds of experts we deal with are epistemic experts: laypeople de-
pend on them for their knowledge of “how the world is” in a certain area, 
and not for their ability to solve practical problems. In case of epistemic 
expertise, a further requirement seems to be that expert knowledge should 
be communicable to be shared with laypeople. Of course, experts’ restricted 
access means that only some aspects of epistemic expertise can be shared 
with non-experts, but the question is still open what these aspects are. In the 
minimal assumption, experts need to be able to answer questions belonging 
their fi eld of expertise, without being able or willing to share the reasons 
and arguments for their answers. Th is would suffi  ce for simple epistemic 
deference, but it seems less satisfactory in case of divided expert opinion 
where laypeople need to choose from several expert claims. As we have seen, 
laypeople can still rely on a number of criteria if reasons and arguments are 
not given, but if it is in the expert’s interest to convince her audience, it seems 
a better option to try to come up with cognitively accessible justifi cation. All 
this depends on the audience–which takes us to the concept of laypeople.
31  Expertise as a result of learning process is at the core of some conceptions such as Hubert 
DREYFUS – Stuart E. DREYFUS, “Peripheral Vision: Expertise in Real World Contexts.” 
Organization Studies, vol. 26, 2005, p. 779–792.
32  Pierre BOURDIEU, “Th e Forms of Capital.” In: RICHARDSON, J. G. (ed.), Handbook for 
Th eory and Research for the Sociology of Education. New York: Greenwood 1986, p. 241–258.
33  E.g. Steve FULLER, “Th e Constitutively Social Character of Expertise.” International 
Journal of Expert Systems, vol. 7, no. 1, 1994, p. 51–64.
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3.2 Laypeople
Th ose who do not belong to the social networks of science are oft en referred 
to as “the public”. In recent literature, two approaches are distinguished in 
the fi eld of “public understanding of science”: the defi cit model and the con-
textual model.34 In the defi cit model the layperson is viewed as someone yet 
ignorant of science but capable of having their head “fi lled” with knowledge 
diff using from science. Such a “fi lling process” increases, fi rst, laypeople’s 
scientifi c literacy (and their ability to solve related technical problems), 
second, their degree of rationality (following the rules of scientifi c method), 
and third, their trust in and respect for science. Th is model ruled the tradi-
tional conception of the fi eld until recently when it has been criticized and 
widely replaced by the contextual model. According to the latter, members 
of the public do not need scientifi c knowledge for solving their problems, 
nor do they have “empty memory slots” to receive scientifi c knowledge at all. 
Instead, the public’s mind is fully stuff ed with intellectual strategies to cope 
with problems they encounter during their lives, and some of these pro-
blems are related to science. So the public turns to science actively (instead 
of passive reception), more precisely to scientifi c experts, with questions 
framed in the context of their everyday lives.
Now the questions the public is interested in can rarely be answered by 
“ready made science” deposited in textbooks, but they belong to “science in 
the making”.35 Instead of asking precisely how planets or pendulums move, 
to which there are answers that are consensual and yet mostly irrelevant to 
the public, they want to know e.g. what materials or activities are healthy, 
and these questions are (still) controversial in science. So people are faced 
with a plethora of diff erent and partly contradicting expert opinions, from 
which they have to build their system of beliefs. If the contextual model 
provides a correct description of the basic situation here, then the problems 
of epistemic dependence and non-expert evaluation of experts become vital.
Such a conceptual shift  in the public understanding of science is linked 
with recent fundamental changes in both the structure of science and the 
34  E.g. Alan G. GROSS, “Th e Roles of Rhetoric in the Public Understanding of Science.” Public 
Understanding of Science, vol. 3, 1994, p. 3–23; or Jane GREGORY – Steve MILLER, “Caught 
in the Crossfi re? Th e Public’s Role in the Science Wars.” In: LABINGER, J. A. – COLLINS, 
H. (eds.), Th e One Culture? A Conversation about Science. Chicago – London: University of 
Chicago Press 2001, p. 61–72.
35  For the diff erence, see Bruno LATOUR, Science in Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press 1987.
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social image of the role of science. Th ese processes are related to the concepts 
of post-academic science36 or mode-2 science37, both re-describing science as 
transforming into a market-minded social structure. More directly relevant 
here is the idea of “post-normal science”38, according to which decisions in 
the science and technology of our age are achieved under the circumstances 
of high risk and uncertainty. A similar idea was the initial premise of the 
SEE approach, i.e. the speed of decisions in science can never catch up with 
the speed of decisions outside science, and this always requires that the 
non-expert sphere should bring decisions in technical matters of scientifi c 
expertise.
All this together is the answer to what Collins and Evans called the 
problem of legitimacy: why laypeople should be engaged in decision mak-
ing in fi elds of expertise. In social studies of science, similar and related 
questions have inspired numerous practical approaches, for instance, in 
the fi eld of “public participation in science”.39 Th e three main orientations 
are the following:40 1. In the theoretical approach, general consequences of 
the socio-cultural phenomenon of epistemic dependence are sought (e.g. 
social epistemology). 2. Th e political approach discusses the possibilities of 
improving socio-economic decision-making processes by involving experts, 
in a situation where the socio-economic space of science have outgrown its 
classical epistemic niche (e.g. post-normal science). 3. Th e activist approach 
addresses non-experts and aims at making the public more knowledgeable, 
responsible and interested with respect to scientifi c and technological pro-
cesses infl uencing their everyday lives.
Such a public is essentially diff erent from the servile and passive laypeo-
ple compatible with Hardwig’s description. External evaluations of scientifi c 
issues are part and parcel of present cultures. But the contextual model also 
36  E.g. John ZIMAN, “‘Postacademic Science’: Constructing Knowledge with Networks and 
Norms.” Science Studies, vol. 1, 1996, p. 67–80.
37 Michael GIBBONS – Camille LIMOGES – Helga NOWOTNY – Simon SCHWARTZMAN 
– Peter SCOTT – Martin TROW, Th e New Production of Knowledge: Th e Dynamics of Science 
and Research in Contemporary Societies. London: Sage 1994.
38  Silvio FUNTOWICZ – Jerome RAVETZ, “Science for the Post-Normal Age.” Futures, 
vol. 25, 1993, no. 7, p. 735–755.
39  For a summary, see e.g. Massimiano BUCCHI – Federico NERESINI, “Science and Public 
Participation.” In: HACKETT, E. J. et al. (eds.): Th e Handbook of Science and Technology 
Studies. Th ird Edition. Cambridge: MIT Press 2007, p. 449–472.
40  Based on Edward WOODHOUSE – David HESS – Steve BREYMAN – Brian MARTIN, 
“Science Studies and Activism: Possibilities and Problems for Reconstructivist Agendas.” 
Social Studies of Science, vol. 32, no. 2, 2002, p. 297–319.
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makes it clear that the non-expert’s choice between expert opinions is not 
a matter of scientifi c knowledge (for if it was, laypeople would have to know 
more science than scientist themselves to make decisions about questions 
still controversial in science). Rather, it is a matter of external skills such as 
social, argumentative, and perhaps other forms of discrimination, what we 
call here contextual, as opposed to substantial, knowledge.
3.3 From laypeople to meta-experts
Th e discussion up to now might have created an impression of a group of 
laypeople facing another (albeit perhaps heterogeneous) group of experts, 
standing on the two sides of the expert/non-expert divide. However, since 
expertise is domain-specifi c, all experts are laypeople at the same time in all 
the fi elds outside their scope of expertise. And this entails that the epistemic 
dependence relation holds not only between scientists and non-scientists, 
but also between scientists representing diff erent specializations.
Th is aspect was already examined in the classical paper of Hardwig who 
elaborated on the consequences of the division of epistemic labor necessarily 
inherent in the complex and cooperative scientifi c activity of present days 
(he analyses a scientifi c paper with 99 authors). In social studies of science, 
features stemming from the “disunity of science” have also been emphati-
cally investigated,41 and a number of concepts describing diff erent bound-
ary phenomena have been introduced, such as boundary work,42 boundary 
object,43 boundary infrastructure,44 or boundary organization45 – all heavily 
bearing on the political context. Another related concept, “trading zone”46 
41  Peter GALISON – David STUMP, Th e Disunity of Science. Stanford University Press 1996.
42  Th omas F. GIERYN, “Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: 
Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists.” American Sociological Review, 
vol. 48, 1983, p. 781–795.
43  Susan L. STAR – James R. GRIESEMER, “Institutional Ecology, ‘Translations’ and Boundary 
Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907–39.” 
Social Studies of Science, vol. 19, no. 3, 1989, pp. 387–420.
44  C. BOWKER – Susan L. STAR, Sorting Th ings Out: Classifi cation and Its Consequences. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1999.
45  David H. GUSTON, “Stabilising the Boundary Between U. S. Politics and Science: Th e Role 
of the Offi  ce of Technology Transfer as a Boundary Organisation.” Social Studies of Science, 
vol. 29, 1999, no. 1, p. 87–111.
46  Peter GALISON, Image and Logic: A Material Culture of Microphysics. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press 1997.
Gabor Kutrovátz
495
has been taken up by Michael Gorman47 and then by the SEE program48 to 
show how expertise is transformed in the dynamics of disciplinary inter-
faces in science. Perhaps it is worth adding that Collins started his career by 
studying the role of tacit knowledge in science,49 later central to his concept 
of expertise, which he found so much local that it is inaccessible outside 
a small “core-set” working strictly together.
In sum, patterns of external evaluation and warranted epistemic de-
pendence are present everywhere in and around science. Th e contextual 
model extends beyond its original scope (public understanding of science) 
toward the entire culture of expertise, including the inner workings of sci-
ence. Of course, the need for external judgment can appear in several con-
texts and at diff erent levels, and various forms of scientifi c “meta-expertise” 
may be distinguished in terms of the social context and function (e.g. the 
“periodic table” in SEE suggests a  typology of meta-expertise). Instead of 
trying to introduce systematic distinctions or classifi cations, some forms of 
scientifi c meta-expertise are listed below to represent a possible spectrum in 
a complex cultural space.
Most generally, the informed public of present societies needs to evaluate 
scientifi c matters, as has been argued at length. If the term “meta-expertise” 
suggests that it is a kind of expertise itself then, as I claimed above, the more 
widespread the relevant skills are, the less we may see them as expert skills; 
while it seems a reasonable directive that all members of the public should 
benefi t from improving their skills of evaluating scientifi c claims. But even if 
these skills do not satisfy the restriction criterion, some skills at least satisfy 
the experience criterion in that the reliability of external evaluations may 
be increased by focused experience, e.g. acquaintance with the workings of 
science–remember Brewer’s solution of becoming familiar with credentials 
and organizations, or Goldman’s suggestion of studying track-records, or 
even the idea in SEE to study past experience. Th e point here is not the small 
terminological issue whether ubiquitous, or at least ideally ubiquitous, skills 
might be called expertise or not, but that external judgments on scientifi c 
47  Michael GORMAN, “Levels of Expertise and Trading Zones.” Social Studies of Science, vol. 
32, no. 6, 2002, p. 933–938.
48  Harry COLLINS, Robert EVANS – Michael GORMAN, “Trading Zones and Interactional 
Expertise.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 38, 2007, p. 657–666.
49  Harry COLLINS, “Th e TEA Set: Tacit Knowledge and Scientifi c Networks.” Science Studies, 
vol. 4, 1974, p. 165–186; further elaborated in Harry COLLINS, Changing Order: Replication 
and Induction in Scientifi c Practice. Beverley Hills – London: Sage 1985.
Knowing with Experts: Contextual Knowledge in and Around Science
496
experts are improvable, and if the improvement reaches a level of specializa-
tion then it becomes meta-expertise in a stricter sense.
A need for specialized meta-expertise appears in cases where political 
and economic decisions concerning science are made (science policy and 
administration, distribution of funds and supports, R&D investments, legal 
regulation, etc.). In these cases those who arrive at evaluations of experts 
as a necessary part of their job are “laypeople” in relation to those whom 
they evaluate, since the former’s fi eld of expertise is clearly diff erent from, 
and usually not even overlapping with, the latter’s. Science communication 
is similar in this respect since e.g. compiling and editing scientifi c news 
or reports or expositions for the public amounts to forms of expertise that 
include skills of evaluating and assessing scientifi c expert claims in general, 
in addition to other skills that are markedly diff erent from those needed for 
doing science.50
Even scientists when relying on results of another fi eld use meta-level 
evaluations. In case the expert’s own fi eld is not far from the one subject to 
evaluation, then “skills that have been learned in one scientifi c area” can 
be “indirectly applied to another”, as Collins defi nes the category of “re-
ferred expertise”,51 in connection with multidisciplinary project managers 
who have to make decisions in areas outside their original fi eld. But expert 
performance evaluations are more frequently made internally to fi elds of 
specialization, e.g. by refereeing publications and grants. An important 
question is whether evaluations within a  specialty are fundamentally dif-
ferent from evaluations made by outsiders. Th ere are two reasons why I tend 
to deny such a fundamental diff erence (but of course not any, or even any 
important, diff erence). Th e fi rst is that as noted above, classical works in 
science studies showed that certainty and full cognitive access in science are 
extremely local,52 and that all claims are highly indexical and contextual53 
– which casts serious doubt on the possibility of purely “internal” evalua-
tions even between peers. Second, as Helga Nowotny argues,54 expertise is 
50  For details see Massimiano BUCCHI – Brian TRENCH (eds.), Handbook of Public 
Communication of Science and Technology. London – New York: Routledge 2008.
51  Harry COLLINS – Gary SANDERS, “Th ey Give You the Keys and Say ‘Drive It!’ Managers, 
Referred Expertise, and Other Expertises.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol. 
38, 2007, p. 621–641.
52  See COLLINS, Changing Order; or Trevor PINCH, Confronting Nature: Th e Sociology of 
Solar-Neutrino Detection. Dordrecht – Boston: D. Reidel 1986.
53  Karin KNORR-CETINA, Th e Manufacture of Knowledge. Oxford: Pergamon Press 1981.
54  Helga NOWOTNY, “Democratising Expertise and Socially Robust Knowledge.” Science and 
Public Policy vol. 30, no. 3, 2003, p. 151–156.
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“transgressive”, fi rstly because it can never be reduced to purely scientifi c 
and technical matters, and secondly because its audiences are never solely 
composed of fellow-experts. To put it more simply, as scientifi c practice goes, 
not even the blind referee system of journals is devoid of non-technical, i.e. 
external, factors in evaluation.
To note, another type of meta-expertise is represented by scientifi c 
meta-disciplines such as history of science, philosophy of science, sociology 
of science, etc. But while these professional meta-experts may claim to have 
a profound understanding of what constitutes scientifi c expertise, oft en they 
avoid being meta-experts in the sense used so far, i.e. in forming evalua-
tions of expert performance. Especially in the social studies of science, the 
initially dominant approach was shaped by the Edinburgh School’s neutral 
descriptivism55 and Collins’ methodological relativism,56 according to which 
analysts of scientifi c activity should completely refrain from making evalu-
ations in the domain of science. However, such an avoidance of normativity 
has been explicitly challenged by the program of SEE, at least in the sense 
that scientifi c meta-experts should work out those criteria which can inform 
warranted evaluations of expert claims. Th e followings are meant to contrib-
ute to this project.
4. Meta-expertise
4.1 Assumptions
We have seen so far that the situation of epistemic dependence, as under-
stood in the light of recent work in science studies, involves the generally 
widespread and unavoidable evaluation of scientifi c experts. Such situations 
are not specifi c to the public sphere outside science, nor are they limited 
internally to science, but they are present in a wide range of contexts in and 
around science, that is, contextually. Since expert knowledge means restric-
ted cognitive access, evaluations always involve some amount of “contextual 
knowledge”, and its proportion quickly increases with the distance of eva-
luators from the proper area of evaluated experts. Contextual knowledge 
makes it possible for the laypeople to know with experts without having to 
know precisely what experts know.
55  David BLOOR, Knowledge and Social Imagery. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1976.
56  Harry COLLINS, “What is TRASP: Th e Radical Programme as a  Methodological 
Imperative.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, vol. 11, 1981, p. 215–224.
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Before trying to outline the idea of contextual knowledge by giving 
examples of its elements, a commitment and a few assumptions need to be 
mentioned. Th e commitment is that the concept of meta-expertise used here 
has a  normative character. Th e purely descriptive question of how people 
do evaluate each other’s claims can be approached in a number of ways, e.g. 
by proper methods in social psychology57, or by surveying discursive meta-
evaluations58. On the other hand, epistemologists like Brewer and Goldman 
address the normative problem of how people should evaluate expert claims, 
i.e. how they can become rationally convinced, rather than merely per-
suaded. Such a conception of rationality presupposes that there are factors 
in selecting and evaluating epistemic experts that increase the reliability of 
decisions, as compared to those decisions based on more general cognitive 
mechanisms ignoring these factors. It also implies that it would be benefi cial 
for individuals in our culture, and thus for the culture in general, to increase 
their attention to these factors, and it would be benefi cial for relevant deci-
sion makers to make the contextual knowledge needed for judging scientifi c 
expert opinions more available to members of our society. While I  share 
these authors’ normative commitment, without further arguments for the 
reliability of choices and cultural benefi t (which seems to be an issue at least 
as pragmatic as theoretical), I  maintain that corresponding discussions 
should be informed by recent focuses and fi ndings in the social studies of 
science, e.g. as summarized in section 3.
As regards my further assumptions, the fi rst is that meta-expertise 
should be improvable (by experience), as already seen in connection with 
the general notion of expertise. Th ere may be instinctive or unrefl ected 
factors that play some part, and potentially a major part, in our responses 
to others’ claims, but here only such factors will be considered that com-
municative agents can control and consciously cultivate. Most aspects of 
57  For a  summary of approaches, see Arie W. KRUGLANSKI – David SLEETH-KEPPLER, 
“Th e Principles of Social Judgment.” In: KRUGLANSKI, A. W. – HIGGINS, E. T. (eds.), Social 
Psychology. Handbook of Basic Principles. 2nd edition. New York – London: Th e Guilford Press 
2007, p. 116–137. For the case of epistemic authorities like experts, see Arie W. KRUGLANSKI 
– Amiram RAVIV – Daniel BAR-TAL – Alona RAVIV – Keren SHARVIT – Shmuel ELLIS – 
Ruth BAR – Antonio PIERRO – Lucia MANNETTI, “Says Who?: Epistemic Authority Eff ects 
in Social Judgment.” In: ZANNA, M. P.  (ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. 
Vol. 37. New York: Academic Press 2005, p. 343–392.
58  I attempted to test the typologies of evaluative factors (summarized in section 2) on extensive 
blog discussions of a publicly relevant and controversial scientifi c matter, the H1N1 vaccine 
issue of 2009. See Gábor KUTROVÁTZ, “Trust in Experts: Contextual Patterns of Warranted 
Epistemic Dependence.” Balkan Journal of Philosophy, accepted paper.
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an arguer’s “demeanor” are ignored on this ground, assuming that while 
they have a considerable impact on the audience’s attitudes, they act at an 
unavoidably subconscious level. In other words, meta-expertise is a result of 
focused learning process.
Another assumption is that meta-expertise is domain-specifi c. While 
all communicative agents are able to make social discriminations as a result 
of their socialization process, ubiquitous skills are insuffi  cient for attain-
ing warranted evaluations of epistemic experts if specialized skills are also 
available. However, this assumption is not equivalent to the restriction con-
dition of expertise mentioned earlier, since we do not necessarily describe 
meta-experts in the sense that their competence in judging scientifi c experts 
would make them cognitively valuable for those who epistemically depend 
on them for their meta-scientifi c evaluations. Th e normative commitment 
above requires from all laypeople that they should improve their specifi c 
skills of meta-expertise–while not excluding the possibility of there being 
others, engaged specifi cally in regular decisions about science, with higher 
degree of specialized meta-expertise based on more comprehensive experi-
ence. Th ere are skills that are ubiquitous and still improvable to a degree of 
high specialization, like language use according to the SEE program, or car 
driving, a pet example of expertise in Hubert Dreyfus’ theory.59 All I assume 
here is that some relevant competences can be improved by focused experi-
ence and training.
4.2 Elements
Turning now to the constituents of contextual knowledge relevant to meta-
-expertise, a  brief list of some elements is to follow. Th is is defi nitely not 
meant as a comprehensive collection of all the elements or even the types of 
elements, but as a  slightly systematic expansion of some suggestions cited 
in section 2, in the light of the theoretical considerations of section 3. Th e 
purpose is to illustrate the kind of contextual knowledge effi  cient in judging 
experts, and not to build a complete theory of it. Th is will already suffi  ce for 
off ering some suggestions regarding directions of future research.
Th e fi rst group of elements contains argumentative factors. Provided 
that arguments supporting expert opinions are given, laypeople can con-
sider some general characteristics of these arguments. Th e claim here is that 
cultivated awareness of argument use and skills of argument analysis can 
59  DREYFUS – DREYFUS, “Peripherial Vision.”
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increase the reliability of judgments on experts. Argument evaluation as 
understood here does not include Brewer’s “substantive second guessing” 
or Goldman’s “direct argument justifi cation”, since these require substan-
tial, rather than contextual, understanding of expert claims (although, as 
I argued above, purely substantial evaluations do not seem to exist). On the 
other hand, I also exclude a part of what Goldman called “dialectical per-
formance”, since the quickness and readiness of replies to objections seems 
to belong more to the arguer’s demeanor than to the structure and strategy 
of argumentation, and thus fall on the side of psychological factors infl uenc-
ing mere persuasion–and while in some cases they tend to be informative 
indeed, oft en they are strongly misleading.
But there are several contextual discursive factors more closely tied up 
with the epistemic virtue of arguments. For example, consistency (and also 
coherence) of arguments, clarity of argument structure, supporting rela-
tions between premises and conclusions, etc. Of course, the more esoteric 
a domain’s cognitive toolkit is, the harder it is for an outsider to diff erentiate 
between form and content, and to detect inconsistency or circularity and 
similar faults–still in many cases these factors are easier to judge than the 
soundness of substance. A similar matter is the degree of reliability of argu-
ment forms used by the expert.60 Arguments can be weakened, albeit at the 
same time increased in persuasive potential, by diff erent appeals to emotions 
and sentiments, or by abusive applications of ad hominems, or by irrelevant 
or misleading appeals to authority, etc. Also, dialectical attitude (instead of 
dialectical performance) can be highly informative, i.e. moves and strategies 
in controversies, including conscious or unnoticed fallacies such as straw 
man, red herring, question begging, shift ing the burden of proof, and more 
generally, breaking implicit rules of rational discussion.61
It must be noted that all the factors mentioned above provide reasons 
for doubting opinions and withholding doubt, rather than enhancing agree-
ment. Nevertheless, negative evaluation can be used in relative comparisons 
and thus give essential support to choices between expert claims. Moreover, 
60  As argued e.g. by Douglas WALTON, Witness Testimony Evidence. Argumentation, Artifi cial 
Intelligence, and Law. Cambridge University Press 2008.
61  For a set of these rules, see Frans van EEMEREN – Rob GROOTENDORST, A Systematic 
Th eory of Argumentation: Th e Pragma-Dialectical Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2004, p.  190–196. As to how committing fallacies relates to these rules 
of discussion, see Frans van EEMEREN – Bart GARSSEN – Bert MEUFELS, Fallacies 
and Judgments of Reasonableness. Empirical Research Concerning the Pragma-Dialectical 
Discussion Rules. Berlin: Springer 2009.
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fallacies can also be given a  more context-sensitive analysis, and seen as 
moves in the process of “strategic maneuvering” negotiating between the 
persuasiveness and reasonableness.62 Th e general point is that these com-
petences, on the one hand, can be improved by experience and training in 
argumentation analysis and, on the other hand, are domain-independent 
and therefore diff erent from the skills specifi c to restricted fi elds of exper-
tise. Th eir range covers any area where patterns of reasoning and rational 
discourse are acknowledged, including all forms of epistemic expertise.
Th e other group of meta-expertise elements I consider here belong to 
the fi eld of “social intelligence”. Some of these are naturally such that we 
acquire them through living in a society, e.g. the detection of interests and 
biases, or of some general signs of trustworthiness, but precisely because 
these are ubiquitous they do  not need focused eff ort and training to im-
prove, so they are not seen as meta-expertise. But there are other social fac-
tors related specifi cally to the evaluation of epistemic experts (i.e., scientifi c 
experts in the typical case), about which laypeople have a lot to learn and 
experience.
Let us recall the examples given by Collins and Evans63 mentioned in 
section 2.4, namely that most people, relying simply on their social intel-
ligence, are able to arrive at correct judgments on matters such as the scien-
tifi c status of astrology, or the reality of moon-landings, or of the failure of 
cold fusion experiments. Why I am not convinced by these examples is that 
I doubt whether ubiquitous social skills are enough to set these matters right: 
I believe that additional social skills targeted to the epistemic culture of sci-
ence are needed in these cases. Unlike other important cultural spheres like 
that of politics, economy, or sports, about which laypeople are more likely to 
make reliable social evaluations, science as a social system is hardly known 
by the public. Th e assumption that social intelligence can inform technical 
decisions does not apply to the case of scientifi c matters if laypeople have 
much less social intelligence regarding how science works than knowledge 
of actual scientifi c “truths” taught in schools.
Meta-scientifi c knowledge informing meta-expert evaluations involves 
an understanding of the social dimension of the workings of science. For 
instance, in order to make the credentialist solution plausible, one needs to 
know about the social network of credentials, hierarchies of statuses and 
62  Frans van EEMEREN (ed.), Examining Argumentation in Context. Fift een Studies on 
Strategic Maneuvering. Amsterdam: John Benjamins 2009.
63  COLLINS – EVANS, Rethinking Expertise, p. 45–48.
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institutions, types and functions of qualifi cations and ranks, etc. A similar 
knowledge is needed to detect more subtle interests and biases. It is also 
useful to understand patterns of communication in science, the role of 
diff erent publications and citations, mechanisms of consensus formation, 
the nature of interdisciplinary epistemic dependence and resulting forms 
of cooperation, etc. Besides, transparency of sites and practices in science 
may also prove useful, including forms of local cooperation, the instru-
mental dependence of research, roles of uncertainty and skepticism, and 
so on.
While understanding all these phenomena may seem too strong an ex-
pectation from the public, it seems likely that becoming familiar with these 
requires less eff ort than learning substantial claims of the diff erent sciences, 
partly because social structures and mechanisms are easier to understand 
(based on our fundamental experience with them) than abstract facts. 
Classical works in the social studies of science were oft en written with the 
explicit purpose of informing the public about how science actually works.64 
While the aim was improving the public’s social intelligence regarding sci-
ence, and thus informing their relevant decisions, in vivo descriptions of sci-
entifi c research oft en triggered heated attacks for opening the way to science 
criticism.65 However, the arguments in this paper have hopefully provided 
another reason why punctual and widely available descriptions of scientifi c 
practice are useful for present societies.
4.3 Areas
While contextual knowledge about science may be essential in societies 
that depend in manifold ways on the sciences, it is not obvious how and 
why the public attention could turn to these matters. If spontaneous focus 
on scientifi c meta-expertise might be unrealistic to expect from the public, 
there are organized ways to improve cognitive attitudes toward science. 
64  E.g., the Golem-series: Harry COLLINS – Trevor PINCH, Th e Golem: What You Should 
Know about Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993; Harry COLLINS – 
Trevor PINCH, Th e Golem at Large: What You Should Know about Technology. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1998; Harry COLLINS – Trevor PINCH, Dr. Golem: How to Th ink 
about Medicine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005.
65  See the “science wars”, e.g. Paul GROSS – Norman LEVITT, Higher Superstition: Th e 
Academic Left  and Its Quarrels with Science. New Haven: Yale University Press 1994; or Alan 
D. SOKAL – Jean BRICMONT, Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of 
Science. New York: Picador USA 1998.
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I briefl y mention three areas: education, science communication, and pub-
lic engagement.
From the preceding arguments the claim follows that school curricula 
should contain, besides (and perhaps sometimes, instead of) scientifi c ma-
terial, meta-scientifi c elements as well. In a world saturated with scientifi c 
and technological issues, relevant historical, sociological, and perhaps 
philosophical considerations are at least as informative about science as 
scientifi c facts, since they contribute to the development of competences 
like that of the evaluation of expert claims, as seen in the preceding section. 
In many countries however, science curricula in schools is overwhelmingly 
dominated by knowledge of science, versus knowledge about science which 
usually fails to appear in any systematic form. Moreover, when it appears 
at all, knowledge about science oft en means to cover methodological issues 
inherited from traditional philosophy of science, i.e. those classical topics 
(verifi cation and falsifi cation of theories, induction and deduction, reduc-
tion and underdetermintation) that have more to do  with philosophical 
abstraction than with the actual workings of science as cultural practice and 
institution. While opinions may divide as to whether explicit meta-scientifi c 
knowledge of this broader type is useful to scientists, the argument here im-
plies that such a knowledge is indispensable for everyone eff ected by but not 
immersed in the scientifi c practice of a restricted fi eld, including laypeople 
and other specialists alike.
In addition to off ering meta-scientifi c knowledge, general school educa-
tion should also focus on improving dialectical competences and skills of 
argument evaluation (critical literacy). Th is again increases the degree of 
reliability in decisions between expert opinions, as students gain organized 
experience, by practicing and studying mechanisms of rational deliberation 
and consensus formation, in how to participate in argumentative, instead 
of authoritarian, life forms. Here the departure from the classical content 
knowledge type of education toward experience-based training is absolutely 
vital. Again, there is a notable cultural invariance in the degree of focus-
ing on “debating practices” and discursive deliberations in general school 
education (in many countries, frontal teaching of contential material is still 
overwhelmingly dominant), but increasing emphasis is given worldwide to 
related competences in education policies and directives.
In science communication, similarly to education, sensitivity to the 
social context of science is desirable. Keeping an eye on the needs of the 
public and another on the needs of scientifi c institutions, science studies can 
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effi  ciently inform diff erent ways of communicating science.66 Th is requires 
essential transformations e.g. in popular science writing and broadcasting. 
Classical works in science popularization were conceived in the framework 
of the defi cit model, and they typically off ered “heroic myths” of science in 
order to increase public respect. Compared to these, the more realistic images 
portrayed by recent science studies research, showing science as a  human 
activity with all the consequences, may seem debunking or degrading. Th e 
increasingly explicit background question here is who should write popular 
science and with what purpose. Th e traditional way of scientists popularizing 
science is confronted with the growing need, typically claimed by science 
studies researchers, to improve public understanding of the social roles and 
capacities of science, in order to facilitate both communication and cultural 
and institutional support. Regarding this latter purpose, it is worth noting 
that, if popularizing works off er an image that is incompatible with the 
public’s experiences with science (which are oft en related to the imperfect 
“human” side), they are likely to increase distrust rather than enhance trust.
Another area here is the presentation of scientifi c issues in the media. 
Usual information-providing communication practices (newspapers, news 
broadcasts, internet news portals) are most oft en ignorant of the actual 
social dimensions of science, and they are unable to improve the public 
image. Frequently journalists themselves lack the necessary understanding 
of scientifi c research and publication, and they are rarely able to locate the 
proper status of what certain scientists claim, or to contextualize assertions. 
Th e image emerging from typical media accounts is that of the defi cit model 
(“science says so and therefore you should take it”), rather than giving 
contextual information, arguments and evidentiary support in order to 
enhance informed decisions in a public confronted with obvious but covert 
uncertainties and contradicting authoritarian claims. Increased awareness 
of how science is communicated in the news media is especially important 
since this information channel reaches a wider public than popular science.
Both education and science communication are areas where contextual 
knowledge informing epistemic decisions could reach the public in organ-
ized forms–while it remains a question, in the light of the contextual model, 
how open the public can be to these sources of information. In order to 
increase public attention to science, the most effi  cient way is to involve the 
public in scientifi c matters. We have already mentioned the increasing inter-
66  Jane GREGORY – Steve MILLER. Science in Public: Communication, Culture, and 
Credibility. New York – London: Plenum Trade 1998.
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est of science studies in phenomena related to the public engagement with 
science, and the shift  from an image of autonomous science toward concep-
tions with political and economic focuses, but discussing the details would 
be beyond the scope of this paper. Th e point here is not ethical (the public 
should gain access to decisions infl uencing their lives) or political (related 
to practices of participatory democracy), but simply epistemological: the 
degree of contextual knowledge required to make warranted decisions about 
experts and matters of expertise depends on the public’s interest in science, 
which in turn depends on their engagement with it.
5. Conclusion
While the original concept of epistemic dependence seemed to suggest 
simple deference to, and blind trust in, expert opinions, recent research in 
science studies have shown that epistemic dependence is closely tied up with 
choices between experts and evaluations of expert claims. Our need to rely 
on expert specialists in many walks of life does not eliminate our cognitive 
autonomy–rather, it off ers meta-levels of epistemic practice. Expert claims 
amount to a chaotic and inconsistent sea of opinions without assessments 
at utilization. An essential aspect of human rationality consists of making 
justifi ed decisions about claims made by others, even when these others are 
supposedly more knowledgeable.
Th e tension between the necessity of epistemic reliance on specialist 
claims on the one hand, and the necessity of evaluating these claims on the 
other, can be resolved only when the criteria used for evaluation are diff er-
ent from the epistemic criteria used by the experts for making their claims. 
Th is suggests a distinction between substantial knowledge and contextual 
knowledge, or between knowing something simpliciter (directly) and know-
ing something with others (indirectly). Th e distinction does not suggest 
ranking in terms of importance or even reliability: the contexts of use are 
entirely diff erent in the two cases, as are the skills and competences the two 
types of knowledge require.
I have tried to illustrate the idea of contextual knowledge by giving ex-
amples of the factors that can rationally inform our meta-expert evaluations. 
Still, the paper’s interest was primarily theoretical: a re-conceptualization of 
the epistemological profi le of expert cultures with a high degree of speciali-
zation and cooperation. Th e major point is bringing epistemic dependence 
into the scope of rational cognition, so that we can know with experts with-
out having to know what they know.
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